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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of  corporate governance and firm characteristics on corporate 
restructuring in Korea after the economic crisis. We specifically analyze factors that had a bearing 
on corporate restructuring following the sudden economic downturn. In particular, we examine the 
impact of  firm characteristics such as leverage levels and prior performance, together with ownership 
structure like insider block-holding ownership, foreign investor ownership, and institutional investor 
ownership on the extent of  asset sales. The empirical results show that firm characteristics such as 
high prior performance have a negative impact on asset sales while high leverage has a positive 
impact. In the ownership structure, insider block holding and foreign investor ownership have 
negative impacts on asset sales.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of  the prominent aspects of  corporate behavior in Korea in the aftermath of  
economic crisis was the rise in corporate restructuring activities undertaken by 
corporations to survive the crisis. The crisis in the financial sector, which led to a 
severe credit crunch and skyrocketing interest rates, created serious liquidity 
problems for the already overleveraged firms. On the top of  that, a decline in 
domestic demand led to a decline in firm profitability. Within a few months after the 
crisis erupted it became evident that firms could not survive without taking 
immediate measures to restructuring and, consequently, embarked on such program 
on a massive scale.  
While the impact of  government-led restructuring policy is widely analyzed in 
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the economic policy literature, most previous research approached the topic from 
the point of  view of  the national economy (Ahn et al. 2003, Sohn 2002). These 
studies however did not closely examine firm-level determinants of  corporate 
restructuring. This study addresses this research gap by examining the firm-level 
determinants of  asset restructuring. In particular, our primary research question is: 
what factors drove firms to undertake asset sales after the economic crisis? 
Existing explanations on the determinants of  asset restructuring can be broadly 
categorized into environmental and agency theory explanations (Bethel & 
Leibeskind 1993, Johnson 1996). Environmental explanations of  asset restructuring 
posit that the rise in corporate restructuring in the U.S. was due to changes in the 
regulatory and competitive environment, e.g. government antitrust and tax policies, 
monitoring and discipline from external capital markets through acquisition threats, 
and increases in competition leading to rise in corporate restructuring. In such 
circumstances managerial motivation to sell assets are based on efficiency gains. 
Managers only retain productive assets from which they believe they can gain 
competitive advantage and will sell assets that other parties can manage more 
efficiently (Hite, Owers, and Rogers 1987, Maksimovik and Philips 2002). In 
contrast, the financing hypothesis of  asset sales, which is based on agency theory, 
argues that managers value firm size and control. Contrary to efficiency gains, 
managerial motivation in this case is to sell assets in order to survive the credit 
crunch. Under this theory, managers sell assets to obtain funds when alternative 
sources of  financing are too expensive due to agency cost of  debt or information 
asymmetry, which makes equity sales unattractive (Lang, Poulsen and Stulz 1995). 
In this study we extend the agency theory view by examining the determinants 
of  asset restructuring in the Korean business environment after the economic crisis. 
Agency theory emphasizes the conflict of  interest between managers and 
shareholders. While shareholders’ wealth depends solely on the market value of  the 
firm, managers’ pay depends more on firm size and bankruptcy risk (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Consequently, managers have no compelling motivation to sell 
assets unless they face the risk of  bankruptcy or are pressured to restructure by 
shareholders looking to enhance firm value.   
In considering the post-crisis economic environment, we emphasize managerial 
motivation and the pressure exerted by different block-holding shareholders as the 
main factors behind asset sales in Korea. After the economic crisis, there was 
massive distress in the financial sector, creating a severe credit crunch and serious 
liquidity problems for firms trying to raise funds. As a result, asset sales by managers 
was the most attractive means to obtain critical funding to improve balance sheets 
and generate short-term cash flow to service debts and avoid defaults (Jensen 1986, 
1989) that would have led to managerial job losses.  
Further, we argue that assets sale decisions are not guided by managerial 
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motivation alone. It also depends on the pressure by external block-holding owners. 
Block holders have major wealth at stake in the firm and possess both the 
motivation as well as the power to pressure the managers to run the firm efficiently. 
These block shareholders will pressure management to restructure the firm or sell 
assets to avoid a decline in firm value or, worse, outright bankruptcy. Our view is 
consistent with Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995), who found that firms selling assets 
have high leverage and/or poor performance. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) likewise 
found a positive relationship between insider ownership, block holder ownership, 
and institutional ownership on corporate restructuring. We adhere to this line of  
argument in our paper. 
The organization of  this paper is as follows: In the next section, we briefly 
discuss the genesis of  corporate sector crisis in Korea and the government’s 
corporate restructuring policies. In the following section, we present theories and 
hypotheses on the determinants of  asset sales. We then turn to a discussion of  the 
data, variables and methodology used in the study to test the hypotheses and, in the 
final section, discuss our findings and implications.  
 
 
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND KOREAN CORPORATE SECTOR  
The economic crisis that hit Korea at the end 1997 was due to a combination of  a 
weak financial sector, rapidly depleting foreign exchange reserves and high levels of  
corporate debt. The corporate sector had structural problems prior to the crisis that 
made it vulnerable to external shocks. At the onset of  the economic crisis, the 
Korean corporate sector was characterized by diversified business portfolios with 
highly leveraged capital structures, while at the same time suffering from declining 
profitability. Excessively financed by debt, Korean firms diversified extensively, 
especially during the 1990s. The government-controlled banks lent money mainly on 
the basis of  collateral rather than earnings measures, cash flow management or the 
debtor’s ability to repay the debt. As a result the average debt to equity ratio of  
Korean manufacturing firms was more than 300% during the 1990s. Moreover, the 
ratio of  short-term debts to total debts was as high as 60% at the end of  1996. The 
profitability of  Korean firms experienced a declining trend especially from 1995, 
reaching negative growth in 1997. Further, Korean firms had higher liquidity 
constraints, as the share of  illiquid assets on the balance sheet was much higher (Lee 
1998, Sohn 2002). Especially in the case of  firms affiliated with the highly 
diversified, large business groups (known as chaebol) which dominated the Korean 
corporate landscape, the debt to equity ratio was 600% in 1997 (Chang 2003).  
The economic crisis in 1997 clearly revealed the drawbacks of  the corporate 
sector. A number of  firms went bankrupt, including 13 of  the largest chaebols. The 
number of  formal bankruptcies of  incorporated firms went up from 5,157 in 1996 
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to 8,226 in 1997. The non-performing loans in banks reached 16.9% of  total bank 
loans, or 20.7% of  Korea’s GDP in 1997 (Sohn 2002). The increasing number of  
bankruptcies in the corporate sector burdened the financial sector with non-
performing loans. Faced with the intertwined crises of  the financial and corporate 
sectors, the Korean government initiated a policy of  corporate restructuring by 
prioritizing financial sector restructuring. The government established transparency 
measures in financial institutions, insisting forcing institutions to classify their loans 
and adjust their capital adequacy ratios to the minimum standard criterion of  8% 
suggested by Bank of  International Settlement (BIS). As a result, commercial banks 
were extremely reluctant to lend to the corporate sector. Because the corporate 
sector was already heavily dependent on bank loans for survival, this made matters 
even worse for the cash-strapped firms. Further, the government-led debt work-out 
program that was run through creditor banks required firms affiliated with big 
chaebols to reduce their debt to equity ratios to 200% and sell off  non-viable 
affiliates to increase their mid and long-term cash flow. Participation in government-
sponsored corporate rehabilitation programs would otherwise be restricted.  
In addition, the government strengthened the supervision of  banks and 
financial institutions, while liberalizing the market by both eliminating unnecessary 
regulations and opening it to foreign investments. Under the new rules, foreign 
investors were allowed to acquire domestic firms in most industries with few 
restrictions, and with the exception of  a few key sectors. To develop the M&A 
market, the government also abolished the regulations that had made it difficult for 
a firm to acquire another firm. With theses changes, foreign investors purchased 
significant shares of  Korean firms and, in many cases, involved themselves actively 
in management to protect their interests. Additionally, institutional investors were 
allowed to break from past practice and emerge from the shadows at shareholders’ 
meeting to use their voice on important management issues.  
To summarize, the post-crisis Korean business environment featured 
overleveraged and low performing firms facing a severe credit crunch under a 
relatively new condition of  close monitoring by shareholders. In the following 
section we develop hypotheses centered on the above business environment in 
Korea. 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Agency Theory, Financing Hypothesis and Corporate Restructuring  
Capital Structure  
Agency theory emphasizes the conflict of  interest between managers and 
shareholders. While shareholders’ wealth depends solely on the market value of  the 
firm, managers’ pay depends more on firm size and bankruptcy risk (Jensen and 
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Meckling 1976). Since managers value bankruptcy risks, they are more likely to avoid 
bankruptcy or default, as these actions would force them to search for new 
employment with a crippled legacy from the previous firm. Managers can avoid 
bankruptcy risks by using internal funds, accessing the external capital market or 
selling their assets. The financing hypothesis of  asset sales argues that high 
leverage/low performance firms will find it difficult to raise funds from external 
capital markets due to an information asymmetry between firm and market that 
makes equity sales unattractive (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 1995). Jensen (1989) argues 
that highly leveraged firms are more likely to restructure their operations, as small 
declines in firm value lead to default. Asset sales and divesting operations provide 
critical short-term cash flow that managers can use to service debts and avoid 
default. Based on this argument Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) found that firms 
with high leverage and low prior performance are more inclined towards asset sales. 
Korean firms were highly indebted when the economic crisis hit the country. 
The average debt-to-equity ratio at 1997 was over 350%, much higher than firms in 
other countries. The economic crisis left the banking sector technically bankrupt, 
with a rise in both non-performing loans and corporate bankruptcies. The IMF-led 
restructuring program raised the interest rates further, making it difficult to borrow 
from the banks. Moreover, armed with guidance from the government, creditor 
banks asked the borrowing companies to reduce their debt-to-equity ratio below 
200%. Raising equity was not easy due to a serious loss of  confidence in the market. 
At this juncture the firms had little choice but to raise funds by selling assets, using 
the proceeds to service their debts. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The leverage of  the firm will be positively associated with the firm’s asset sales. 
  
Prior Performance 
Together with the high leverage structure, prior performance is an important trigger 
for asset restructuring, especially divestiture (Brown, James, and Mooradian 1994) 
and asset sales (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 1995). When firms have low performance, 
asset sales can provide cash flow to strengthen the balance sheet. Brown, James and 
Mooradian (1994) found that firms that had either defaulted or anticipated default, 
divest business units to improve overall performance and generate funds. Lang, 
Poulsen and Stulz (1995) argue that poor performance leads to asset sales as 
managers cannot raise funds in the external capital market. They found a positive 
association between poor performance and asset sales. After the economic crisis, 
generating funds to strengthen the balance sheet was of  paramount importance to 
firms. Those with high prior performance possessed funds to service their debts 
and survive the economic crisis, whereas for firms with low prior performance it 
was necessary to sell assets to generate finances to improve their balance sheet. 
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Therefore, firms with high prior performance will be less inclined to pursue asset 
sales than firms with low prior performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The prior performance of  the firm will be negatively associated with the firm’s 
asset sales 
 
Although we developed our above hypothesis from a financing perspective, 
managerial motivation alone cannot explain the phenomenon of  asset sales. The 
pressure by block-holding shareholders will be important in disciplining 
management to undertake asset sales. Relevant hypotheses have been developed in 
the following section based on ownership structure. 
 
Agency theory, Block holder Monitoring and Corporate Restructuring  
Insider Block-holding Owenership 
Based on the dispersed ownership structure, where ownership is spread among a 
large number of  shareholders and control rests with the manager, agency theory 
argues that large block shareholders can effectively monitor the professional 
manager and push him to run the firm efficiently. As they have a high ownership 
stake, large block holders possess the motivation and power to discipline 
management. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) found that block holder ownership was 
a significant determinant of  downsizing, reductions in total diversification, and 
reduction in inward investments. In contrast to the monitoring role of  block holders 
in firms with dispersed ownership structures, recent studies have emphasized the 
conflict of  interest between insider block-holding owners and minority shareholders 
in firms with concentrated ownership structures (La Porta et al. 1999). In countries 
with concentrated ownership structures, large insider block-holding owners control 
a number of  firms with cross shareholding between firms under their control and 
maintain control rights in excess of  ownership rights. The primary motive of  these 
insider block-holding owners is to maintain control over the firms rather than 
pursuing value enhancing strategies (Bebchuk 1999).  
Traditionally, these insider block-holding owners have been prevalent in Korea 
(Chang 2003, Joh 2003). Especially in the case of  chaebol-affiliated firms, insider 
block-holding owners maintained control over a firm through a circular chain of  
ownership links. Their inclination was more towards maintaining control of  the firm 
than selling assets. The agency costs associated with the insider block-holding 
owners are well documented in existing research in pursuing unrelated 
diversification and other value reducing strategies leading to declines in firm value 
(Baek 2004, Joh 2003). Considering the agency cost associated with the insider 
block-holding owners, we emphasize that insider block holders will be reluctant to 
sell assets for fear of  losing control over other firms under their control. We argue 
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that total large insider block-holding owners will have no incentives to sell assets and 
will use their rights to maintain control over the firm after the economic crisis.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Insider block holding ownership in the firm will be negatively associated with the 
firm’s asset sales.  
 
Institutional Investor Ownership 
Institutional investors play an effective monitoring role in ensuring that managers 
operate the firms efficiently. As institutional investors own a large portion of  shares 
in the firm, they have the power and incentive to influence management.  Existing 
research has emphasized the monitoring role of  institutional investors because they 
act as intermediaries for third party investors. These institutional investors manage 
shares on behalf  of  other investors and their performance is measured in terms of  
their own financial successes (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). As they are 
accountable to their investors, institutional investors will be more inclined to 
monitor the managers, pushing them to run the firm efficiently and increase firm 
value. Recent research suggests that institutional shareholders play an active role in 
firm strategies in general (Kochhar and David 1996, Tihyani, Johnson, Hoskisson 
and Hitt 2003) and corporate restructuring in particular (Bethel and Liebeskind 
1993).  
In the case of  Korea, institutional investors played a limited role in controlling 
managers prior to the economic crisis. The government controlled banks until the 
economic crisis in 1997. And, although banks held securities, they had little incentive 
and expertise to undertake monitoring. In addition, rather than fulfilling this 
monitoring responsibility, non-bank financial institutions were controlled by the 
business groups and acted as stooges to the existing management. However, the 
post crisis financial restructuring provided more autonomy to these institutions, 
while also making them more accountable to their customers. As a result, the 
character and role of  institutional investors changed from mere holders of  securities 
to active participants in corporate governance. Based on this, we hypothesize that 
firms with higher institutional ownership will force managers to sell assets in order 
to raise adequate capital to improve the balance sheet. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Institutional investor ownership in the firm will be positively associated with 
firm’s asset sales. 
 
Foreign Investor Ownership 
Recent studies on the role and motivation of  foreign investors emphasize the 
corporate governance role of  foreign investors in emerging economies (Khanna and 
Palepu 1999, Baek et al. 2004). According to these studies, foreign investors are not 
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only a source of  alternative financing but also play monitoring role like other 
shareholders in emerging markets. Their role is important, especially when the 
monitoring skills of  external owners are inadequate. Additionally, foreign investors 
have valuable corporate governance experience in developed markets and can bring 
their monitoring skills to emerging markets. Khanna and Palepu (1999) asserted that 
foreign investors tend to invest more in transparent companies, which have fewer 
internal transactions through internal capital market in emerging markets like India.  
After the economic crisis, the investment environment on the Korea stock 
exchange became more foreigner-friendly, attracting investment from foreign 
portfolio investors. As of  2001, foreign investors comprised 30% of  total market 
capitalization of  Korean listed firms (Shin and Chang 2003). Shin and Chang (2003) 
also found support for the monitoring role of  foreign investors. They saw that a rise 
in foreign investors led to change of  CEOs at Korean firms with low profitability. 
Based on the above argument, we hypothesize that foreign investors will play a 
monitoring role in Korean companies and induce asset sales to improve the 
financials of  the firm after the economic crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Foreign investor ownership in the firm will be positively associated with firm’s 
asset sales  
 
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METODOLOGY 
Data  
The data to test above hypotheses were obtained from the TS2000 database 
compiled by the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA hereafter). KLCA 
was established in 1973. It is the most reliable database available in Korea and 
several previous studies have used the database (Shin and Park 1999). The database 
contains financial and ownership information of  all the listed firms in the Korea 
Stock Exchange (KSE). This study examines the impact of  corporate ownership 
and firm characteristics on asset restructuring during the period 1997-2002 after the 
economic crisis hit Korean financial and corporate sectors. Although Korea 
officially obtained bail-out loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the 
end of  1997, the economic crisis, especially defaults in the corporate sector, started 
at the beginning of  1997. Companies like Hanbo Steel and Kia Motors were 
declared bankrupt in early 1997. Considering the intensity of  corporate 
restructuring this year, we decided to focus on asset sales from 1997 till 2002. In 
order to gauge the impact of  the independent variables, our observation of  them 
stretches from 1996 till 2001. All the independent variables have a one-year lag with 
the dependent variable. Detailed explanations about the variables are presented 
below. 
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Variables - Asset Sales 
An asset sale is measured by the decrease in the ratio of  the asset during a particular 
year compared to the previous year. We used the measure Asset sales = (Total assets 
(t+1) - total assets (t))/ Total assets (t))<0, where t is year of  observation for the 
independent variable. We included only the firms which have reduced their asset in 
time t+1 compared to time t. In other words, for restructuring in 1997, we measured 
the asset sales variable as (total asset in 1997 - total asset in 1996)/total asset in 1996. 
The independent variables in the regression are measured for the year 1996 as 
discussed below. We found 1361 firm year observations, which reduced their assets. 
However, our final sample consists of  686 firm year observation with firms 
performing asset sales during the period from 1997 till 2002 and without any 
missing values about explanatory variables.  
 
Insider Block-holding Ownership (IOWN):  
Corporate ownership in Korean firms is concentrated in the hands of  insider block-
holding owners, generally with the family owner and affiliates. The TS2000 database 
provides a detailed account of  insider block-holding ownership which consists of  
ownership rates and three kinds of  ownership ratios: the ownership rate of  the large 
shareholder individually, the ownership rate of  the family, and the ownership rate of  
affiliated companies controlled by the family. We added the above three variables to 
calculate the insider block-holding ownership. Previous studies have used this 
measure to test the impact of  ownership concentration on firm performance 
(Chang 2003, Joh 2003).  
 
Institutional Investor Ownership (INSTOWN):  
The ownership rates of  institutional investors consist of  three kinds of  ownership 
shares: the ownership share of  banks, the ownership share of  insurance companies, 
and the ownership share of  brokerage houses. We added the above three variables 
to calculate the institutional investor ownership. Similar measures were used by a 
number of  existing studies for their role in corporate governance (Pound 1992), 
firm strategy (Thyani, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt 2003) and corporate 
restructuring (Bethel and Liebeskind 1993). 
 
Foreign Investor Ownership (FOROWN):  
One of  the most prominent aspects of  corporate ownership in Korea is the rise in 
ownership through foreign shareholding. In leading companies like Samsung 
Electronics, Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) and SK Corporation, 
foreign ownership has increased to more than 50% of  total shareholdings. 
Percentage of  shares owned by foreign investors is available in the above database 
under the identity of  the shareholders and this comprises our final variable, which is 
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similar to the previous studies (Baek 2004).  
 
Leverage:  
A highly leveraged capital structure was one of  the major determinants that worked 
as a catalyst during the corporate crisis in Korea. We calculated the leverage as the 
ratio of  total debt by total asset (Total Debt/ Total Assets). 
 
Prior Performance:  
We calculated prior performance on the basis of  being able to provide a firm with 
cash flow to continue its business despite an economic downturn as Return on 
Invested Capital (ROIC) – calculated as a sum of  net income before tax plus interest 
payments/Total Assets. Chang (2002) has shown that ROIC is a better performance 
measure than Return on Assets, especially in the Korean case. 
 
Control Variables: 
We used three major control variables in the regression analysis. First, we control for 
the firm size because there is possibility that big firms may be more reluctant to 
reduce size. Big firms have more organizational slack and smaller firms will be more 
influenced by the crisis, especially for financial reasons to carry on more 
restructuring. We calculated firm size as the natural log of  sales. As we are 
measuring asset sales, we decided to include sales as a measure of  firm size rather 
than assets to mitigate the correlation affect. Second, liquidity is a major problem 
for firms after the economic crisis. With the banking sector in crisis, the liquid asset 
possessed by a firm is expected to provide the firm with a lifeline to survive the 
crisis. We included liquidity calculated as natural log of  liquid assets. Finally, 
considering the dominance of  chaebols in the corporate landscape of  Korea and 
separate restructuring regulation for chaebol affiliated firms, we decided to control 
the chaebol effect by including chaebol dummies in the regression. Chaebol is a 
dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if  the firm belongs to the top 30 business 
groups in Korea and ‘0’ otherwise. This list of  chaebol dummies was created from 
the list compiled by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) for each year. 
Previous studies have included the chaebol dummy to observe the chaebol effect 
(Chang 2003, Joh 2003). We also controlled the year effect by including year 
dummies. 
 
Methodology 
Based on the above variables, our final model for empirical test is:  
 
(Total assets (t+1) - Total assets (t))/ Total assets (t))<0= f(LSHOWN(t), FOROWN(t), 
INSTOWN(t), Leverage(t), Prior(t), Firm size(t), Liquidity(t), Chaebol dummy, year dummy) 
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We tested the above model using an Ordinary Least Square regression method. 
The descriptive statistics show that some of  the correlation among the independent 
variables is at an acceptable level while the correlation is high between some 
variables. Therefore, we divided the regression models into three independent 
models. This process was carried out to observe the individual effect of  
independent variables separately. In the first model we included only the firm 
characteristics; leverage and prior performance together with the control variables. 
In model 2, we only included the ownership structure variables; insider block-
holding ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership together with the 
control variables. In the final model, we included all the independent variables to 
test the combined effect. The results of  each of  these models are discussed below.  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 1 provides mean, standard deviation and correlation of  variables. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Asset Sales 12.24 12.22 1        
IOWN 31.26 14.44 -0.09* 1       
FOROWN 4.6* 9.2 -0.06* -0.2 1      
INSTOWN 9.18 10.69 0.01 -0.12*** 0.11** 1     
Leverage 66.29 25.8 0.23*** -0.20*** -0.15*** 0 1    
Prior 
Performance 
2.75 17.25 -0.14*** 0.07* 0.13*** 0.06* -0.31*** 1   
Firm Size 19.21 1.46 -0.01 -0.11** 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.12** 0.21*** 1  
Liquidity 9.2 12.78 -0.07* -0.01 0.03 0.08* -0.31*** -0.21*** -0.25*** 1 
 
***P>0.01, **P>0.05, *P>0.1 
  
On an average, the firms reduced their assets by more than 12% during 1997-
2002. The average insider block-holding ownership is more than 31% in the firms 
under observation, followed by institutional investors with 9% and foreign investors 
with around 5%. The high ownership share of  insider-block holding owners is due 
to the fact that they still control the firm by using both direct and indirect 
ownership in the firm. The direct ownership comes via the ownership of  the 
ultimate owner and his/her family members. The insider block-holding owners also 
use various indirect mechanisms to control a group of  firms. These indirect 
ownership mechanisms are largely maintained through inter-corporate shareholding 
under the control of  an ultimate owner. These types of  ownership structures are 
more prevalent in chaebol-affiliated firms. The owner of  the chaebol-affiliated firms 
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controls a group of  firms. Through the control of  a group of  firms, a particular 
firm affiliated with a chaebol could borrow funds from the bank by obtaining 
collateral from other firms in the same group. Moreover, member firms of  a 
particular group cross-subsidized each other by creating an internal capital market in 
Korea (Chang 2000). The creation of  internal capital markets and obtaining bank 
credit made it desirable for business group owners to maintain control over a large 
group of  firms and they became reluctant to loose control.  
In terms of  correlation between some of  the independent variables, insider-
block holding owners and foreign investors, there is a negative correlation with 
leverage, and positive correlation with performance. The government directive for 
all the listed firms to reduce the debt-to-equity level to 200% may have resulted in 
insider block-holding owners reducing the debt levels after the crisis and focusing 
on performance. On the other hand, foreign investors have invested in the firms 
with low leverage and high performance.  
Table 2 shows the regression results. 
 
Table 2. Regression Results 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ownership IOWN  -0.08** -0.04* 
 FOROWN  -0.08* -0.03 
 INSTOWN  0.009 0.02 
Firm 
Characteristics Leverage 0.10***  0.10** 
 Prior Performance -0.05*  -0.04* 
Control Firm Size -0.24 -0.19 -0.25 
 Liquidity -0.005 -0.08* -0.01 
Dummy Chaebol Dummy -1.17 -1.89 -1.25 
 Year Dummy Included Included Included 
R square  0.09 0.04 0.09 
Adj. R square  0.07 0.03 0.07 
F Value  6.70*** 2.98*** 5.36** 
N  685 685 685 
***P>0.01, **P>0.05, *P>0.1 
 
Model 1 shows the individual impact of  firm-specific characteristics on asset 
restructuring. In accordance with hypotheses 1 and 2, we find that an increase in 
leverage leads to more asset sales, while higher prior performance leads to less asset 
sales. The above findings support the financing hypothesis of  asset sales that 
Korean firms with high leverage/low performance sold assets to survive the 
economic crisis, especially due to the liquidity crisis in the financial sector. This is 
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similar to findings in the US (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 1995). These results support 
the agency theory view of  financing, under which managers value firm size and 
control and are compelled to sell assets when alternative sources of  financing are 
difficult to obtain. Faced with the liquidity crunch, Korean managers sold assets to 
avoid bankruptcy.  
Model 2 reports the impact of  ownership variables on asset sales. According to 
hypothesis 3, we find that an increase in insider block-holding ownership leads to 
lower asset restructuring. Insider block-holding owners are characterized as the 
source of  agency problems in previous research on the Korean context. They 
control firms with various mechanisms, especially with a circular chain of  ownership 
among group companies. It seems that even after the economic crisis, insider block 
holders still try to retain control over the firms without divesting assets or focusing 
on the core activities of  the firm.Contrary to hypothesis 4, we find that a rise in 
foreign ownership leads to lower asset sales. This may be due to the fact that foreign 
investors increase their ownership in firms that have already restructured their assets 
without the need for further asset sales. The significant correlation between foreign 
ownership, higher sales and prior performance indicates that foreign investors only 
invest in firms with good growth and higher profitability. Since these firms have 
good performance, they will be reluctant to sell assets. Few empirical studies are 
available on the role of  foreign investors in emerging markets. While one view 
argues that foreign investors play a monitoring role in emerging markets, the other 
view is that foreign investors are only concerned about economic benefits and 
therefore choose firms with good prior performance. Our study hypothesized on 
the monitoring role of  foreign investors but found support for the view that 
foreigners do indeed pick well-performing firms. However, we do not find any 
significant impact of  institutional ownership on asset sales. Although the character 
of  institutional owners has changed since the economic crisis, their monitoring role 
was not found to be significant, especially in the case of  asset sales after the 
economic crisis.   
Model 3 shows the combined effect of  both firm characteristics and corporate 
governance on asset restructuring. We find that the impact of  foreign ownership on 
asset sales becomes insignificant. Also, there is a slight decline in the significance of  
insider block-holding owners on asset sales. However, the other variables with firm 
characteristics remain significant. This is due to the fact that the management of  
highly leveraged firms have opted to sell assets to improve their balance sheet and 
avoid bankruptcy. In addition, the management of  firms with high prior 
performance is less inclined to pursue asset sales. However, insider block-holding 
owners are found to be reluctant to sell assets. One interpretation for this could be 
that insider block-holding owners also appoint their family members as managers 
acting in the interest of  these insider owners. Despite high leverage and low 
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performance, these managers are naturally less reluctant to sell assets directed by the 
large insider shareholders as compared to the professional managers. Chaebol-
affiliated firms were the worst hit after the economic crisis. 13 out of  the top 30 
chaebols went bankrupt. We expected chaebol-affiliated companies will be more 
inclined to sell assets compared to independent firms. However, our chaebol 
dummy was insignificant in all the three models. The propensity of  the crisis was so 
large that all firms faced similar crises after the economic downturn.  
This study analyzed the impact of  firm characteristics and corporate 
governance on asset restructuring. We found support for leverage and prior 
performance on asset restructuring. High leverage/poor performance led to a rise in 
asset sales consistent with the financing hypothesis. We also found support for 
insider block-holding owners and foreign investor ownership on asset sales. These 
results indicate that insider block-holding owners resist radical restructuring despite 
the fact that the firm faces a deep financial crisis. These owners are more interested 
in maintaining control over the firm than inducing managers to enhance efficiency. 
The negative impact of  foreign investors on asset sales is due to the fact that foreign 
investors invest in profitable companies with high growth prospects. Future research 
should explore the impact of  other variables on asset restructuring. Other 
restructuring measures such as organizational and financial restructuring will shed 
new lights on determinants of  corporate restructuring after the economic crisis.  
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